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0. Introduction 
The study of consciousness representation is concerned with two critical issues. On the one hand, it 
confronts the problematic concept of consciousness. On the other hand, it needs to look into the ways 
consciousness is linguistically represented. The classical approach to consciousness representation 
has placed much weight on the latter aspect, that is, the linguistic forms and narrative techniques for 
representing consciousness in fictional texts. Ever since Charles Bally first identified the mixture of 
direct and indirect discourse as a distinctive linguistic form and named it “le style indirect libre”, free 
indirect style1  has won its place as the most influential technique for representing fictional 
consciousness. This unequal focus on the forms and techniques for representing consciousness, 
especially on free indirect discourse, raised serious questions for some postclassical narratologists. 
Alan Palmer (2002, 2004, 2010), for example, suggests discarding what he calls the “speech 
category approach”, or I would rather say thought category approach, to fictional consciousness and 
applying cognitive theories for a better understanding of the way fictional consciousness is 
constructed as in real life. While departure from the category approach to consciousness 
representation means that postclassical narratological scholarship would put aside linguistically 
important significations which stylistic forms imply, remaining within the category approach does 
not seem to involve integrating it with the crucial and beneficial cognitive initiatives.2 
This paper aims to explore classical views on consciousness representation which have been 
discussed in terms of thought representation categories, and postclassical views on consciousness 
representation which are based on the cognitive paradigm, and to propose some ways to integrate the 
linguistic constructs of fictional consciousness with the cognitive science-based paradigm. Section 1 
explores still-influential scholarship on consciousness representation in terms of the category approach. 
Section 2 reviews postclassical criticisms of the category approach and some responses to the 
postclassical view. Section 3 turns to the concept consciousness with particular focus on the levels of 
consciousness discussed in the disciplines of, for example, cognitive science and psychology. The 
concluding section proposes ways to expand the study of consciousness representation on the basis of 
classical and postclassical approaches.  
                                            
1 Free indirect style or free indirect mode is used as an umbrella term to cover a variety of representation 
modes in speech, thought, perception, etc. which reflect the mingling of the points of view of the narrator 
and a character.  
2 The importance of the cognitive turn is also discussed in Rundquist (2014). I will discuss the relationship 
between the classical and postclassical approaches more in detail in Section 3. 
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1. The “Thought” Representation Paradigm 
1.1. Thought Representation Categories 
Thought representation has been the central narrative framework for the analysis of fictional 
consciousness. One of the most influential studies of thought representation is Dorrit Cohn’s 
insightful book, Transparent Minds (1978). She distinguished three modes of thought representation: 
psycho-narration (“the narrator’s discourse about a character’s consciousness”), quoted monologue 
(“a character’s mental discourse”), and narrated monologue (“a character’s mental discourse in the 
guise of the narrator’s discourse”) (1978: 14). Her terminology is based on the distinction between 
the narrator’s language (narration) and the character’s language (monologue). The mixture of these 
two, therefore, becomes “narrated” “monologue”. Her equal devotion to the three modes as well as 
to both third- and first-person narratives has been very beneficial to the later study of thought 
representation. Cohn’s tripartite categories are still used in the field of narratology.3  
Thought representation has often been discussed together with speech representation under the 
heading of “speech and thought representation” or “discourse representation” due to their formal 
similarities. In stylistics, the clinal model of speech and thought representation originally suggested 
by Geoffrey Leech and Mick Short (1981) has been regarded as “the first stylistic treatment to bring 
a fully analytical approach to the topic, introducing a model that has proved influential over the three 
decades” (Bray, 2014: 222). In their model, the speech and thought representation categories are 
arranged in a linear continuum according to the degree of the narrator’s control over report as in 
Figure 1: 
[N] 
[N] 
NRSA 
NRTA 
IS 
IT 
FIS 
FIT 
DS 
DT 
FDS 
FDT 
Figure 1.  Leech and Short’s original continuum of speech and thought representation4 
                                            
3 See, for example, the introductory books on narratology by Fludernik (2009), Keen (2015), etc. 
4 N: Narration, NRSA: Narrator’s Report of Speech Acts, IS: Indirect Speech, FIS: Free Indirect Speech, DS: 
Direct Speech, FDS: Free Direct Speech, NRTA: Narrator’s Report of Thought Acts, IT: Indirect Thought, 
FIT: Free Indirect Thought, DT: Direct Thought, FDT: Free Direct Thought.  
NRSA and NRTA stand for “Narrative Report of Speech/Thought Acts” in Leech and Short (1981), or 
“Narrator’s Representation of Speech/Thought Acts” in Short (1996) and Semino and Short (2004). However, 
I will use the label “Narrator’s Report of Speech/Thought Acts”, because “Narrator’s” clarifies the 
representing subject, and “report” suggests the way in which the narrator represents what he/she has to 
inform the narratee about. Reporting does not necessarily have a connotation of “anterior discourse” as 
Semino and Short (2004: 3) explains: by the act of reporting, the representing subject can convey an account 
of either something that actually happened (not only discourse but also actions, events, happenings, facts, 
etc.) or something that did not happen (for example, something imaginary) in his/her own words, or in other 
words, from his/her point of view. Reporting is thus a part of narrating acts (see OED, s.v. report, v. 1. a., in 
which report is defined as “to relate, narrate, tell, give an account of (a fact, event, etc.)”). The term 
representation is used instead to cover all sorts of speech and thought categories in this paper. I also replaced 
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The narrator’s control is the greatest for the categories at the left side of the scale, and diminishes 
towards the right side of the scale and becomes more character-centred. In other words, the distance 
between the narrator and the character is gradually shortened for the categories towards the right end. 
The Leech and Short model was expanded in Semino and Short (2004), in which more narrator-centred 
categories than narrator’s report of speech acts (NRSA) and narrator’s report of thought acts (NRTA) 
were suggested:  
[N] 
[N] 
NV 
NI 
NRSA 
NRTA 
IS 
IT 
FIS 
FIT 
(F)DS 
(F)DT 
Figure 2.  Leech and Short’s continuum of speech and thought representation revised by Semino 
and Short (2004)5 
Cohn’s psycho-narration roughly corresponds to indirect thought (IT), NRTA, and Internal narration 
(NI), narrated monologue to free indirect thought (FIT), and quoted monologue to (free) direct thought 
((F)DT). 
Before I turn to the problematic relationship between speech and thought, it will be helpful to look 
at a passage containing the above-mentioned varying categories in Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe. 
My examples given in this paper will mainly be taken from Defoe’s first-person narratives for two 
reasons. 1) Literary critics have usually analysed passages of what are called third-person narratives. 
As a consequence, attention to first-person narratives has been considerably limited.6 Although the 
narrator and one of the characters share the same pronoun “I” in first-person narratives, this “I” has 
different functions as two selves: the narrating self who tells a story and the experiencing self who 
experiences things in the story world. The narrating self’s relationship to the experiencing self 
corresponds to the narrator’s relationship to the character in third-person narratives (Cohn, 1978: 143). 
The fluctuating distance between the narrator and the character represented through the varying 
categories can be applied to the relationship between the narrating self and the experiencing self in 
first-person narratives. 2) Literary critics have also concentrated on what are called consciousness 
                                                                                                                                                  
Leech and Short’s NRA (narrator’s report of action) with N because it is the more commonly-used term in 
stylistics and narratology. N is put in square brackets because although it is an important part of 
representation, it is not a speech and thought representation category in a strict sense. 
5  NV: Narrator’s Report of Voice, NI: Narration of Internal states, (F)DS: (Free) Direct Speech, (F)DT: (Free) 
Direct Thought.  
The same discussion applies to the label “Narrator’s Report of Voice” as explained in Note 4 (Semino and 
Short’s original label for NV is “Narrator’s Representation of Voice”). FDS and FDT are better regarded as 
subcategories of DS and DT respectively because the distinction between the direct and the free direct does 
not seem to involve significant differences in effects as the distinction between the indirect and the free 
indirect does (see Semino and Short, 2004: 49; Short, 1989: 70-71; Short 2007: 228-233). DS and FDS, 
therefore, are abbreviated as (F)DS, DT and FDT as (F)DT in Figure 2. 
6  But see, for example, Adamson (1995), Chafe (1994), Cohn (1978), etc. 
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novels after Jane Austen and consequently the novels before Austen, especially those in the early 
eighteenth-century, have not yet been analysed extensively.7 
Defoe’s first-person narratives contain varying narrative techniques for representing consciousness. 
One of the leading literary critics of Defoe, Maximillian Novak, remarks that “Defoe was surely 
interested in rendering the social and political milieu in which his characters moved, but he was always 
more interested in what went on in his characters’ minds” (2000: 248). Defoe not only creates the 
illusion of reality on the basis of the social, political and economic realities of the time, but also 
intentionally uses revolutionary narrative techniques for representing individual psychology to capture 
realistic images both objectively and subjectively.8 In the following passage, the younger Crusoe (the 
experiencing self) begins to have positive thoughts about his solitary condition on the isolated island 
after two years have passed since his arrival there: 
(1) (a) But now I began to exercise my self with new Thoughts; (b) I daily read the Word of 
God, and apply’d all the Comforts of it to my present State: (c) One Morning being very sad, 
I open’d the Bible upon these Words, I will never, never leave thee, nor forsake thee; (d) 
immediately it occurr’d, That these Words were to me, (e) Why else should they be directed 
in such a Manner, just at the Moment when I was mourning over my Condition, as one 
forsaken of God and Man? (f) Well then, said I, if God does not forsake me, of what ill 
Consequence can it be, or what matters it, though the World should all forsake me, seeing 
on the other Hand, if I had all the World, and should lose the Favour and Blessing of God, 
there wou’d be no Comparison in the Loss. (Robinson Crusoe: 97) 
All Crusoe does for two years after his arrival is to lament his misfortune in having no means to escape 
from the island. This passage represents the younger Crusoe’s mind, and perfectly captures the 
cognitive process in which he changes the way he thinks. It is represented through various thought 
representation categories. First of all, (a) is NRTA, in which the cognitive act of the past self is 
represented (“exercise my self with new Thoughts”). Secondly, (b) and the latter part of (c) are 
narration (N).9 The actions of the experiencing self are narrated in them (“I daily read …,” “I open’d 
…,” etc.). The earlier part of (c) contains NI which represents the state of mind of the younger Crusoe 
(“being very sad”). Thirdly, (d) consists of a reporting clause (“it occurr’d”) and a subordinated 
reported clause (“That these Words were to me”), and thus it is categorized as IT, in which the younger 
Crusoe’s cognition is represented. Subsequently, the co-occurrence of the interrogative mood with the 
narrative past tense suggests that (e) is FIT. The interrogative mood implies that it is reflective and 
most likely to be articulated thought. Finally, highly articulated thought is represented in the last 
                                            
7  But see, for example, Bray (2003), McDowell (1973), Neumann (1992), etc. 
8  See Kawasaki (2007: 73-76), Konigsberg (1985: 1-16) and Novak (2000: 248-250). 
9  Note that (c) contains writing representation (“I open’d the Bible upon these Words, I will never, never leave 
thee, nor forsake thee;”), which will be briefly discussed in 1.2. 
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sentence (f) through direct thought (DT). It has a reporting clause (“said I”, here used to mean “I said 
inwardly”) and a juxtaposed reported clause in the present tense (“does not forsake,” “can … be,” etc.). 
It is easily recognized that the passage shows the movement from the left end to the right end of Leech 
and Short’s model. As such, change in thought representation categories displays the younger Crusoe’s 
cognitive process, and therefore the climax of his cognitive process is effectively represented in the 
passage.  
1.2. Problematic Parallelism between Speech Representation and Thought Representation 
While most critics agree that speech and thought are formally very similar, they have also identified 
differences between them in terms of their effects. Leech and Short (1981) systematically 
distinguished the contextually independent but formally parallel scales of speech and thought 
representation for the first time, which has been helpful to analysts in investigating their different 
effects (Bray, 2014: 222-223; Fludernik, 2011: 40; Semino and Short, 2004: 9-16). Even before their 
systematic distinction between speech and thought, Cohn had pointed out the arguable parallelism 
between “spoken discourse” and “silent thought” (1978: 11): 
Speech is, by definition, always verbal. Whether thought is always verbal is to this day a matter 
of definition and dispute among psychologists. Most people, including most novelists, certainly 
conceive of consciousness as including “other mind stuff” (as William James called it), in 
addition to language. This “stuff” cannot be quoted – directly or indirectly; it can only be 
narrated. One of the drawbacks of this linguistic approach is therefore that it tends to leave out 
of account the entire nonverbal realm of consciousness, as well as the entire problematic 
relationship between thought and speech. (Cohn, 1978: 11) 
Despite this critical insight into the speech-thought relationship, this issue has not been explored in 
depth in the disciplines of classical narratology and stylistics.10 Semino and Short expanded the 
realm of the study by adding writing representation to their revised framework of the Leech and Short 
model, because, while writing representation “is not usually very central (except for the epistolary 
novel)” in fictional texts, it “occurs quite regularly in news reports and (auto)biography” (Semino and 
Short, 2004: 47-48). It seems that they have expanded the framework in that direction either due to 
their interest in the formal similarities between the representation of speech and writing or due to their 
engagement in discourse representation. In terms of consciousness representation, paralleling writing 
representation with speech representation, and even with thought representation does not seem to lead 
                                            
10 Cohn (1978) hinted at the problem, but did not delve into the realms of what she calls “the entire nonverbal 
realm of consciousness” (1978: 11). McHale points out that Cohn deliberately neglected the representation of 
perception: “Cohn is at pains to mark off the boundary between the representation of consciousness as such 
[and] the more general phenomena of point of view or perspective or vision” (1981: 187, McHale’s Italics). 
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us to a better understanding of fictional consciousness. I will discuss the concept of consciousness, 
expanding the discussion about the problematic relationship between speech and thought in Section 3. 
It is sufficient to point out here that the term thought is unquestionably regarded as synonymous with 
the term consciousness, and consciousness is used in contrast to speech or utterance. 
1.3. Free Indirect Thought 
Free indirect style has been of great scholarly interest to linguists, stylisticians and narratologists 
because of its curious mixture of indirect discourse and direct discourse. It maintains linguistic 
features of the narrator’s subjectivity in terms of tense and person, yet it also exhibits a character’s 
subjectivity through elements such as proximal deictics, expressive constructs and lexis, and so on. It 
was first identified as an independent stylistic device by a French school, and named “le style indirect 
libre” (literally “free indirect style”) by Charles Bally (1912) as mentioned above. The equivalent term 
in German is “erlebte Rede” (literary “experienced speech”) which was suggested by Etienne Lorck 
(1921).11 In English, critics have suggested a variety of names: substitutionary speech (Fehr, 1938), 
narrated monologue (Cohn, 1978), represented speech and thought (Banfield, 1982; Brinton, 1980; 
Ehrlich, 1990), verbatim indirect speech and thought (Chafe, 1994), and empathetic narrative 
(Adamson, 1995). But free indirect speech and thought (or discourse) is the term in English used by 
most critics.12 Being aware of these varieties of terminology, I also use the term free indirect speech 
and thought, not only because it is the most commonly used term, but also because it captures its 
peculiar features in terms of both linguistic constructs and semantic significations. According to Pascal, 
“free” in Bally’s terminology (“libre”) originally “indicate[s] freedom from conjunctions and from 
introductory verb” (1977: 31). But it also has the implication of “other and astonishing liberties” “in 
the relation of the statement to the fictional character and narrator, in the tense-system, in the language, 
in the word-order” (Pascal, 1977: 31). “Indirect” may lead to a misunderstanding that the free indirect 
mode is a variant of the indirect mode, but an advantage of using “indirect” is that, in Pascal’s words, 
“it indicates that both a narrator and a character are involved” (1977: 32). Although “indirect” does not 
convey “the mingling, even fusion” of two different points of view (the narrator’s and a character’s) 
(Pascal, 1977: 32), this peculiar aspect of duality can be captured when it is combined with the other 
term “free”. 
FIT is a stylistic device of particular importance in relation to the representation of consciousness. 
                                            
11 See Pascal (1977: 2-32) for the full history of the style in the French, German and English disciplines. 
12 See, for example, Bray (2003; 2014), Fludernik (1993), Leech and Short (2007 [1981]), McHale (1978), 
Page (1988 [1973]), Pascal (1977), Semino and Short (2004), Sotirova (2013), Toolan (2001 [1988]), 
Vandelanotte (2009), etc. Free indirect style has also attracted great attention in functional grammar (see 
Thompson (1996), etc.), cognitive linguistics (see Sanders and Redeker (1996), Vandelanotte (2009), etc.) 
and semantics (see Maier (2015), Eckardt (2015), etc.). 
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Joe Bray points out the importance of FIT in terms of the development of the novel, claiming that “the 
access it allows to consciousness results, in Louise Flavin’s words, ‘in a greater psychological depth of 
character’ (1987: 137)” (2003: 21). According to Cohn, “[b]y leaving the relationship between words 
and thoughts latent, the narrated monologue [FIT] casts a peculiarly penumbral light on the figural 
consciousness, suspending it on the threshold of verbalization in a manner that cannot be achieved by 
direct quotation” (1978: 103), and, in sum, it is “a more complex and a more flexible technique for 
rendering consciousness than the rival techniques [psycho-narration and quoted monologue]” (Cohn, 
1978: 107). 
It is widely known that Jane Austen was the first to use FIT extensively in novels written in English, 
although representing characters’ consciousness has actually been one of the central concerns for 
writers since the Middle English period13 and its techniques including FIT have gradually developed 
over the centuries.14 The following is a prototypical example of FIT from Jane Austen’s Mansfield 
Park: 
(2) To be acting! After all his objections –– objections so just and so public! After all that she 
had heard him say, and seen him look, and known him to be feeling. Could it be possible? 
Edmund so inconsistent. Was he not deceiving himself? Was he not wrong? (Mansfield 
Park: 123) 
This passage has many typical markers of FIT. It expresses Fanny’s subjective consciousness with 
syntactic properties of DT, such as the exclamatory mood (“To be acting!”; “After all his objections –
– objections so just and so public!”), the interrogative mood (‘Could it be possible?’; “Was he not 
deceiving himself?”; “Was he not wrong?”), and incomplete sentences (“Edmund so inconsistent”). 
The expressive elements, such as the progressive (“be feeling”; “was … deceiving”) and epistemic 
adverbs (“so just”; “so public”; “so inconsistent”) also help to promote Fanny’s subjectivity. On the 
other hand, Fanny’s subjective language is combined with that of the narrator: the third-person 
pronoun ‘she’ to designate Fanny and the past and pluperfect tenses corresponding to the surrounding 
narration (“had heard”; “could”; “was”) are used as in IT.  
It is true that Defoe’s use of FIT is not as extensive as Austen’s, but his FIT has the same stylistic 
power to represent the experiencing self’s subjective consciousness: 
                                            
13 See Fludernik’s detailed investigation into Middle English texts (1996a; 1996b: 129-177, 2011). Her 
diachronic approach to consciousness representation is very beneficial. 
14 See Bray (2003: 22) and Bakhtin (1984: 36). Bakhtin observes that “[n]ew forms of artistic visualization 
prepare themselves slowly, over centuries; a given epoch can do no more than create optimal conditions for 
the final ripening and realization of a new form” (1984: 36). 
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(3) (a) Sometimes I fancy’d it must be the Devil; and Reason joyn’d in with me in this 
Supposition: (b) For how should any other Thing in human Shape come into the Place? (c) 
Where was the Vessel that brought them? (d) What Marks were there of any other 
Footsteps? (e) And how was it possible a Man should come there? (f) But then, to think that 
Satan should take human shape upon him in such a Place where there could be no manner of 
Occasion for it, but to leave the Print of his Foot behind him, and that even for no Purpose 
too, for he could not be sure I should see it; (Robinson Crusoe: 131)15 
The context is that the younger Crusoe was perplexed by the human footprint he found on the shore of 
the isolated island, and the passage shows the inner struggling of the younger Crusoe. The first half of 
(a) is a representation of thought through IT, in which the point of view of the younger Crusoe seems to 
be mingled. This is indicated by the use of “must”. The modal auxiliary must is one of the 
“speaker/hearer-oriented modals” and invokes the presence of the represented subject in his/her 
temporal domain (Davidse and Vandelanotte, 2011: 243). The use of “must” shows, therefore, the 
subjective mood of the represented subject, here the younger Crusoe. This subtle blend of point of 
view between the older and the younger Crusoe is a sign that the narrating self is gradually 
empathizing with the experiencing self. The latter half of (a) is a representation of mental action, and 
the reason for this mental action is represented through the interrogative sentences from (b) to (e). 
These sentences are easily recognized as FIT by the combination of interrogative mood with the past 
tense. These examples show that the linguistic features of Defoe’s FIT are very similar to those of 
Austen’s above. In these FIT sentences, the younger Crusoe is trying to overcome his fright by asking 
questions which rationalize his supposition that the footprint is the Devil’s. Because this rationalizing 
process is represented through a FIT question form, the sentences (b) to (e) are reflective and probably 
articulated consciousness, but the last sentence (f) seems to be on what Cohn calls “the threshold of 
verbalization” (1978: 103). The younger Crusoe de-rationalizes his former supposition, expressing 
himself by the interjectional expression “to think that …”, in which the subjective consciousness of the 
younger Crusoe is linguistically represented (for example, the frequent use of the modal auxiliaries 
“should” and “could”). The passage shows the potential of FIT to represent varying ways in which the 
character thinks according to the content and context of a represented scene. 
2. Criticism of the Category Approach 
Alan Palmer calls the framework of speech and thought representation in classical narratology the 
“speech category approach”, because “the narratological analysis of characters’ thought process is 
based on the assumption that the categories that are applied to fictional speech can be 
                                            
15 For convenience of explanation, I have alphabetically numbered the sentences or clauses in this paper where 
necessary. 
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unproblematically applied to fictional thought” (Palmer, 2004: 13, 53). He criticizes the “speech 
category approach” because “it is concerned primarily with the part of mind known as inner speech, 
the highly verbalized flow of self-conscious thought” (Palmer, 2004: 53, Palmer’s Italics). 16 
According to Palmer, there are at least five problems with this approach: 1) “[t]he privileging of the 
apparently mimetic and rather glamorous categories of free indirect thought and direct thought over 
the diegetic and seemingly uninteresting category of thought report [Cohn’s psycho-narration, Leech 
and Short’s IT, NRTA and NI]”; 2) “[t]he overestimation of the verbal component in thought”; 3) “[t]he 
resulting neglect of the thought report of characters’ states of mind”; 4) [t]he privileging of some 
novels over others, and some scenes in novels over others”; and 5) [t]he tendency to give the 
impression that characters’ minds really only consist of a private passive flow of consciousness” 
(Palmer, 2004: 57-59). Palmer, like other postclassical narratologists such as David Herman (2011a), 
explains that “narrative theory should be regarded as a branch of cognitive science” (2004: 45). He 
believes that “the parallel discourses of cognitive science, psycholinguistics, and philosophy have a lot 
in common with the mind pictures of both readers and narrators” in narratology (2004: 75). Ultimately, 
his theory of fictional minds is a theory about “characters’ minds, not just in terms of passive, private 
inner speech in the modes of direct or free indirect thought, but in terms of the narrator’s positive 
linking role in presenting characters’ socially engaged mental functioning, particularly in the mode of 
thought report” (Palmer, 2004: 16). He lists nine key semantics of thought report (I give an example 
from Defoe’s narratives for each attribute): 
1) Presentation of variety of mental events: “What to do I knew not, nor to whom to have 
recourse; to keep in the House where I was, I could not, the Rent being too great; and to 
leave it without his Order, if my Husband should return, I could not think of that neither; 
so that I continued extremely perplex’d, melancholy, and discourage’d, to the last Degree.” 
(Roxana: 13) 
2) Presentation of latent states of mind: “… and as I knew that the first Storm that blew must 
necessarily break her all in Pieces, …” (Robinson Crusoe: 47) 
3) Presentation of mental action: “This baulk’d me a little, and I resolv’d to push at 
something or other, for I was not us’d to come back so often without Purchase;” (Moll 
Flanders: 214) 
                                            
16 Palmer uses the term “mind” in preference to “consciousness”, because the latter term has the implication of 
“inner speech” and “self-consciousness” (2004: 19). He argues that the term “mind” can refer to broader areas 
than the term “consciousness”, such as “non-consciousness and latent states of mind” (2004: 19). It is 
generally said in cognitive science that “mind” can refer to more, but on the other hand, “consciousness” can 
mean much more than Palmer assumes. I use the term “consciousness” in this paper, because it better suits the 
purpose of the present discussion. I will discuss the concept of consciousness in Section 3.  
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4) Presentation of character and personality: “I was … sharp as a Hawk in Matters of 
common Knowledge; quick and smart in Discourse; apt to be Satyrical; full of Repartee, 
and a little too forward in Conversation; or, as we call it in English, BOLD, tho’ perfectly 
Modest in my behaviour.” (Roxana: 6) 
5) Summary: “However, I preserv’d the Youth of my Temper; was always bright, pleasant in 
Company, and agreeable to every-body, or else every-body flatter’d me;” (Roxana: 182) 
6) Presentation of background information: “I had alas! no divine Knowledge;” (Robinson 
Crusoe: 76) 
7) Presentation of intermental thinking: “While we were thus preparing our Designs, …” 
(Robinson Crusoe: 218) 
8) Expression of consensus: “… it began to be publick, that Roxana was, in short, a meer 
Roxana, neither better nor worse; and not that Woman of Honour and Virtue that was at 
first supos’d.” (Roxana: 182) 
9) Interpretation, analysis, and judgment: “… yet the young Cats were the same Kind of 
House breed like the old one; and both my Cats being Females, I thought it very strange:” 
(Robinson Crusoe: 88) 
Palmer then discusses how the mind functions in fictional texts as in real life, using cognitive 
science-based methodology in preference to the category approach. His focus is not on the 
representation of consciousness but on the “fictional mental functioning” (2004: 97, my Italics). 
Indeed, he makes the basis of his analysis of fictional consciousness perfectly clear in the sequel to 
Fictional Minds (2004): 
I argue that this issue [social minds in the novel] looms large as a technique and as a subject 
matter in all of the novels that I discuss, but techniques and subject matters are parts of novels, 
not purposes of them. They are means rather than ends. What matters, ultimately, is the purpose 
to which a particular sort of consciousness representation is put. So my concern in the chapters 
that follow is with the purposes of presentations of social minds. (Palmer, 2010: 63, my Italics) 
Palmer’s work, though very influential in narratology and stylistics, received due 
counter-criticisms from some literary critics and stylisticians. Joe Bray (2014) and Eric Rundquist 
(2014), for example, question Palmer’s de-prioritization of the category approach. Particularly, Bray 
counter-attacks Palmer’s severe treatment of FIT, claiming that “it [FIT] is capable of representing 
more than simply the private, passive, solitary individual consciousness with which he associates it” 
(2014: 226). This is not a recent claim in stylistics and narratology. The extensive usage of FIT has in 
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fact been pointed out by many stylisticians and narratologists. Remember Cohn’s observation about 
the style’s potential ability to represent “the threshold of verbalization in a manner that cannot be 
achieved by direct quotation” (1978: 103), for example. Contrary to Palmer’s de-prioritization of the 
category approach, a great importance is attached to the linguistic constructs of each category, because 
they are “semantically relevant for how texts are read and interpreted and how fictional 
consciousnesses and narrative worlds are constructed” (Rundquist, 2014: 161). Another counterattack 
on Palmer’s work is Brian McHale’s article “Transparent Minds Revisited” (2012), in which he claims 
that the effects of “Palmer’s “whole mind” argument … is to turn nearly everything into a 
manifestation of fictional mind,” and consequently “the enlargement of fictional mind threatens to 
overwhelm the capacity to make the kind of fine-grained discriminations among levels and dosages of 
consciousness” (2012: 119). 
As Rundquist argues, although “[t]he paradigm shift to cognitive science methodology” by 
postclassical narratologists is an important step to the thorough investigation of fictional 
consciousness, “textual foundations of literary discourse” should not be disregarded (2014: 161). The 
future studies of fictional consciousness should find ways to “integrate [linguistic constructs employed 
in consciousness representation] with the cognitive paradigm” (Rundquist, 2014: 161). In the 
following3, I suggest that the first step to do this is to break the parallelism between speech and 
thought by delving into the levels of consciousness. 
3. From “Thought” Representation to “Consciousness” Representation 
As shown by my quotation in the previous section, Palmer emphasizes the importance of ends at the 
expense of the means.17 Means and ends work together, however. Means, or the linguistic forms and 
the narrative techniques, are important and always relevant to the signification they represent, and the 
investigation into means consequently contributes to the understanding of ends, the purposes of the 
represented matters. In Wallace Chafe’s words, “[i]f the linguistic evidence were missing, the 
enterprise would be nothing more than a commentary on my own mental processes, which might or 
might not be of interest to anyone else” (1994: 27). On the one hand, it is undoubtedly true that the 
cognitive approach to fictional consciousness is an important and influential turn in narratology. The 
investigation into consciousness itself seems to be lacking in the classical narratological or stylistic 
                                            
17 But note that some cognitive scientists, for example Gilles Fauconnier (1997), do not disregard the 
importance of linguistic constructs as Palmer does. Fauconnier stresses the importance of linguistic evidence: 
“we must apply our scientific imagination and rational deduction to language signals in the same way that 
astrophysicists exploit the information they glean from infrared radiation or gamma rays” (1997: 3). Indeed, 
his theories (mental spaces, conceptual blending, etc.) are based on cognitive methodology, but he shows 
linguistic evidence as much as other situational evidence such as “highly structured background knowledge, 
various kinds of reasoning, on-line meaning construction, and negotiation of meaning” (1994: 8) in proving 
his theories. 
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approach, and “the purposes to which a particular sort of consciousness representation is put” (Palmer, 
2010: 63) therefore seem to have been less discussed in the consciousness representation framework. 
On the other hand, Palmer’s assertion that “[w]hat is required is not to try to modify the speech 
category account, but to step outside its limitations altogether” (2004: 75) does not seem to be going in 
the right direction.18 This section delves into the left-out “problematic relationship between thought 
and speech” (Cohn, 1978: 11) in the linguistic approach in terms of the levels of consciousness, 
referring to some important science-based paradigms, as a first step towards integrating them with 
insights into linguistic representations of consciousness. Note that I make a clear distinction between 
the terms consciousness and thought. I do not use the term thought synonymously with consciousness, 
simply because consciousness is more than thought and this very synonymous use of the two terms 
seem to be one of the factors which hinder further explorations into fictional consciousness in the 
previous studies of consciousness representation. Consciousness representation, therefore, should not 
be regarded as the same as thought representation. I will give further explanations of this topic after 
discussing the problematic relationship between speech and thought. 
3.1. Perception, Conception, and Language 
The fact that thought and speech are similar in their linguistic constructs implies that linguistic 
realization of thought assumes inner speech. Put differently, because thought has a potentiality for 
verbalization, its representation in language can take similar forms to representation of speech. 
However, it is scientifically proved that “thought is possible without inner speech” (Palmer, 2004: 93). 
A well-known case is aphasia. Patients with aphasia cannot comprehend language, but they have “a 
wordless thought process” (Damasio, 1999: 109). According to Chafe, “[r]epresentations of speech 
always go back to distal language, but representations of thought are less committed in that respect”, 
and that thought could be both verbal and nonverbal (1994: 219). The narrotologist Monika Fludernik 
also observes that “not all consciousness is necessarily verbal; a parallelism between forms of speech 
representation and the representation of consciousness is therefore misleading” (2011: 40). 19 
                                            
18 Surprisingly, while Palmer disregards means of consciousness representation in Social Minds in the Novel 
(2010: 63) as quoted above, he focuses on means, emphasizing their interdependent relationship with ends in 
the article published the following year (2011: 274). In spite of his focus on means in the article, linguistic 
evidence for explaining the ways in which consciousness is represented is lacking. See also the commentary 
by Sotirova (2013: 31) on the fact that another postclassical narratologist, David Herman (2011b), does not 
give sufficient linguistic evidence in his analysis of consciousness representation either, even though he 
emphasizes the interdependency between how (means) and what (ends) (2011a). 
19 Fludernik seems to use the term consciousness inconsistently. Despite the fact that she defines consciousness 
in a broader way (see 3.2), her use of the term in her discussion about discourse representation often indicates 
“thought” (see Fludernik, 1993; Fludernik, 1996b).  
Fludernik’s use of the term consciousness in my quotation seems to be synonymous with “thought” in my 
terminology: the frameworks which have been paralleled are speech representation and thought 
representation and not speech representation and consciousness representation. As discussed later, the 
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According to the anatomist Takeshi Yoro, there are a perceptual world, a conceptual world, and an 
overlapping area in which language functions (2005: 120-123). Language takes only a small part of the 
world as Figure 3 shows: things that are represented through language (speech) are small compared to 
those represented through conception (thought) or perception. 
 
Figure 3. Conceptual world and perceptual world and language20 
From a different point of view, what language does is to “[make] it possible to transcend immediate 
perceptions, actions, and evaluations and [allow] a person to experience secondhand what others 
experienced firsthand” (Chafe, 1994: 237). Speech, therefore, could of course be a representation of 
experienced events, but could also be an articulation of experienced thought, perception or other sorts 
of consciousness which are nonverbal (see the arrows in Figure 3). Speech is primarily a matter of 
discourse, but thought is a matter of consciousness. In this sense, speech and thought work on a 
different plane. Speech sometimes functions as a mere action (to speak, to utter) or event (that the 
speech act is made), although change in varying forms of speech representation can indeed reflect 
nonverbal aspects of consciousness such as the mental attitudes of a character.  
3.2. Levels of Consciousness 
I have elsewhere implied that consciousness means much more than thought. It is not so easy to 
make a universally acceptable definition of consciousness. Many scientists, psychologists, linguists 
and other scholars have focused on the problems of consciousness, endeavouring to answer the 
question “what is consciousness?” According to the linguist Wallace Chafe, consciousness is “what 
we experience” (1994: 27). It consists of “experiences of perceptions and actions”, “evaluations” 
which “cover[s] all aspects of conscious experience that involve emotions, opinions, attitudes, 
desires, and the like”, and “introspections” (1994: 31). The narratologist Monika Fludernik similarly 
                                                                                                                                                  
linguistic constructs of other levels of consciousness like perception have not been investigated in depth, and 
therefore we do not know whether the formal differentiae between speech and thought can also be found in 
the representations of other sorts of consciousness. 
20 Partly reproduced from Yoro (2005: 121) 
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 remarks that “[c]onsciousness comprises both lived experientiality and intellectual attempts to deal 
with experience, and it includes the comprehension of actancy just as it necessarily embraces an 
understanding of mental processes” (1996: 49-50). The neuroscientist Antonio Damasio puts it more 
simply, suggesting that “[f]rom its most humble beginnings, consciousness is knowledge” (1999: 26). 
We have consciousness by the knowledge of perceiving, acting, evaluating and introspecting 
experiences in the external and internal world. 
In her discussion about the thought representation scale, Fludernik explains the difficulty in 
incorporating the verbal-nonverbal distinction into the continuum based on the formal categories: 
When it comes to content, this formal tripartite categorization on a scale from directness to 
indirectness is undermined by the distinction between verbal and non-verbal mind content. This 
provides for an alternative sliding scale that does not completely coincide with the formal scale 
from narrator language to characters’ internal discourse. (Fludernik, 2009: 82-83) 
The “alternative sliding scale” which Fludernik feels is necessary is, as I believe, concerned with the 
levels of consciousness. If consciousness is indeed what we experience, it also has both conceptual 
world and perceptual world as Yoro argues (see Figure 3). In other words, consciousness at least has 
two levels: conceptual and perceptual. This is schematized as follows: 
Figure 4.  Conceptual and perceptual levels of consciousness21 
The psychologist Irvin Rock views perception as intelligent. His view on perception is that “it 
[perception] is based on such thoughtlike mental processes as description, inference, and 
problem-solving, although these processes are rapid-fire, unconscious, and nonverbal” (1984: 234, 
quoted in Searle, 1992: 231). Another psychologist, Nicholas Humphrey, also insists on the 
thought-like nature of perception (1992: 24-23). He further distinguishes perception from another, 
                                            
21 Partly reproduced from Nakao (2016: 4). 
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perceptual, level of consciousness, that is, sensation (1992: 24-30), but I will discuss the distinction 
between conceptual and perceptual levels of consciousness, which is of prime importance, and will not 
try to delve into the distinction between perception and sensation in the following discussion. 
The perceptual level of consciousness has been little investigated by literary critics. As far as I 
know, Chafe’s approach to consciousness is the only attempt to explain how language representation 
works in terms of two different levels of consciousness. His aim was to “suggest a more 
comprehensive understanding of immediate [extroverted, that is, perceptual] and displaced 
[introverted, that is, conceptual] consciousness and their relation to language” (Chafe, 1994: 196).22 
The importance of giving due attention to, in Brinton’s words, “the range and depth of a character’s 
consciousness” (1980: 364) should be revisited in terms of levels of consciousness. This will 
consequently provide “an alternative sliding scale” (Fludernik, 2009: 82) which makes consciousness 
representation a more profound cognitive-science-related linguistic paradigm. In the discussion below, 
I will focus on the narrative technique for representing perception known as “narrated perception”.   
3.3. Narrated Perception 
“Narrated perception” (Cohn, 1978; Fludernik, 1993; Pallarés-García, 2012) is a narrative technique 
for rendering a character’s perceptions of his/her external world as they are experienced by the 
character (Brinton, 1980: 370; Cohn, 1978: 33-144; Fehr, 1938: 98; Fludernik, 1993: 306; 
Pallarés-García, 2012: 171; 2014: 20; Palmer, 2004: 49; Schmid, 2010: 162). This technique has also 
been called “substitutionary perception” (Fehr, 1938; Hernadi, 1972; McHale, 1978), “represented 
perception” (Banfield, 1982; Brinton, 1980; Rundquist, 2014) or “free indirect perception” (Chatman, 
1978; Palmer, 2004; Schmid, 2010). As will be clear in the course of the discussion below, the term 
“narrated perception” is preferred to other terms, because, as Pallarés-García (2012: 184 (Note 1); 
2014: 21) suggests, it implies the close relationship between narration and perception. Fehr gives the 
following example to explain this unique linguistic device: 
(4) “Look!” Fred turned around. Jack was coming across the street towards him. (Fehr, 1938: 
98) 
The second sentence (“Jack was coming across the street towards him”) is narrated perception. The 
first sentence (““Look!” Fred turned around”) functions as what Fehr calls “perception indicator” 
(1938: 98), by which Fred is presented as a person who saw Jack coming across the street. As such, the 
surrounding context helps the reader to interpret the second sentence not as a mere narrator’s 
description of an event, but as a visual perception of Jack. The narrated perception sentence also 
                                            
22 See Part Three/ Displacement in Chafe (1994) for full-length discussion on this subject. 
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contains one of the most typical linguistic features, the past progressive. It is often used in sentences of 
narrated perception because it “can be taken to reflect the simultaneity of the act of perception and the 
perceived reality” (Pallarés-García, 2012: 171). Narrated perception has often been confused with FIT, 
or regarded as a mere aspect of free indirect discourse or a sub-category of free indirect style by some 
literary critics who do not delve into the depth of consciousness.23 According to Pallarés-García 
(2012), however, it has a formal, semantic and functional significance which distinguish it from FIT. 
Formally, it shares with FIT such features as the absence of an introductory clause, and the subjective 
use of the past progressive, proximal deictic adverbs, incomplete sentences, inversions and evaluative 
and epistemic expressions, but unlike FIT it does not typically contain parentheticals, questions and 
exclamations (Brinton, 1980; Pallarés-García, 2012). Semantically, narrated perception captures what 
Chafe (1994: 195-211) calls “extroverted consciousness” (immediate mode), whereas FIT portrays 
“introverted consciousness” (displaced mode) (Pallarés-García, 2012: 175). In terms of narrative 
function, narrated perception has two major functions (representation of a character’s consciousness 
and description of events in the external world), but FIT can only represent a character’s consciousness 
(Pallarés-García, 2012: 175). 
Despite their devoting studies to narrated perception, critics have not yet explored the way this 
technique was employed in early-eighteenth-century novels, or in first-person narratives. My research 
suggests that Defoe uses this style effectively, though not as elaborately or extensively as the writers in 
later periods, such as Austen, do. Especially, narrated perception is effectively used in the robbery 
scenes in Moll Flanders. The following passage is Moll’s first adventure as a thief, in which her visual 
perceptions are represented through narrated perception: 
(5) (a) Wandering thus about I knew not whither, (b) I pass’d by an Apothecary’s Shop in 
Leadenhall-street, (c) where I saw lye on a Stool just before the Counter a little Bundle 
wrapt in a white Cloth; (d) beyond it, stood a Maid Servant with her Back to it, looking up 
towards the top of the Shop, where the Apothecary’s Apprentice, as I suppose, was standing 
up on the Counter, with his Back also to the Door, and a Candle in his Hand, looking and 
reaching up to the upper Shelf for something he wanted, so that both were engag’d mighty 
earnestly, (e) and no Body else was in the Shop. (Moll Flanders: 160) 
In Moll Flanders, narrated perception frequently occurs after narration. In (a), the word “wandering” 
implies that the younger Moll’s mental state is that she is walking without any purpose and she does 
not know where she is going. Thus, her action in (b) (“I pass’d by”) seems to be her recognized action: 
the younger Moll must have seen the shop and recognized that she was passing by it. She also 
                                            
23 See, for example, Chatman (1978), Ikeo (2007), Leech and Short (2007 [1981]), McHale (1978), Pascal 
(1977), Rundquist (2014), Semino and Short (2004), Sotirova (2004), etc. 
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perceives (probably visually) the kind of shop it was and the name of the street (“an Apothecary’s Shop 
in Leadenhall-street”). At the same time, (b) has a narrative function of giving background 
information (that is, the kind of shop it was and the name of the street) so that the reader is able to know 
where the younger Moll is. It does not have any linguistic indices for subjectivity, but (a) helps us to 
read (b) as the younger Moll’s perception of her outer world. This is a good example to show the 
closeness between narrated perception and narration in formal terms.  
In the relative clause (c), the younger Moll’s visual perception is explicitly represented (“I saw”). 
This is a narrator’s report of perception, which I shall call “perception report”. The verb “saw” 
functions as what Fehr calls “perception indicator”, and thus the following clause (d) is likely to be 
narrated perception rather than N. The preposition “beyond” in the first clause of (d) clearly represents 
the younger Moll’s visual perception: she moves her eyes upwards from the bundle to the maid. Note 
also that the word order is inverted (“beyond it, stood a Maid Servant”) in the clause. It can be 
explained by the fact that the subject-verb inversion is required in a sentence in which there is any 
preceding adverbial in eighteenth-century grammar, but it can also be explained in terms of 
representation of consciousness. In Fludernik’s words, “the order of words traces the order of 
perception on the part of the character [here, the younger Moll]” (1993: 306): the younger Moll looks 
up, sees someone standing, and then recognizes that she is a maid servant, that the bundle is behind her, 
and that she is looking up towards the top of the shop. Another narrated perception follows it in the 
relative clause (“where the Apothecary’s Apprentice, as I suppose, was standing up on the Counter”), 
which is formally indicated by the use of the past progressive (“was standing”). The younger Moll’s 
ongoing perception is represented through this linguistic construct. The order of the remaining parts of 
the clause mirrors the order of perception as in the main clause before. Finally, in the last subordinate 
clause in (d), which is also a narrated perception clause, figural perception is indicated by the use of the 
epistemic expression “mighty earnestly”. It conveys a sense of the subjective consciousness of the 
younger Moll. She then visually perceives that there is nobody else in the shop. At the same time, the 
sentence is a crucial one in terms of narrative function because this situation eventually leads the 
younger Moll to steal the bundle.  
These examples of narrated perception explicitly show that they describe what is happening in the 
external world as well as the character’s consciousness. Especially, visual perception is important in 
the robbery scenes in Moll Flanders, because the younger Moll’s perceptions of the outer world are the 
stimuli to take the intended action. Those passages represented through narrated perception show the 
reader directly from the point of view of the experiencing self why Moll is so dexterous in stealing 
things. As such, narrated perception is a formally, semantically, and functionally unique and important 
narrative technique for representing the perceptual level of consciousness. While narrated perception 
has attracted some attention from stylisticians and narratologists, other types of perception 
（29）
  
representation have not been investigated. I have briefly mentioned “perception report”, but it is 
sometimes categorized as narration or psycho-narration, in spite of the fact that it is actually 
representation of perception by the narrator, not a mere narration. If we attempt to approach 
consciousness representation in terms of levels of consciousness to enhance the deep understanding of 
fictional consciousness, we should delve into the ways in which perception is represented as we do in 
thought representation. Put another way, the fact that narrated perception is often discussed as a 
sub-category of a broader free indirect style implies that perception has not yet been fully recognized 
as a possible constituent of “an alternative sliding scale” (Fludernik, 2009: 82) of consciousness 
representation. Do we have other categories, for example, “indirect perception” or “direct perception”, 
as with thought representation categories? If so, do these categories make up a similar continuum to 
that which thought representation categories do? More investigation into the ways in which perception 
is linguistically realized in a fictional text seems necessary. 
4. Digging It out from the Old and the New 
What areas should the study of consciousness representation explore in greater depth for the better 
understanding of fictional consciousness? An integration of the approaches in classical narratology 
with those in postclassical narratological is certainly required, but how should this be done? I hope this 
paper has shown some possible directions for doing this. More investigation into first-person 
narratives and diachronic perspectives are required. We need to disregard the parallelism between 
speech and thought for the sake of reconstructing the thought representation framework as a 
consciousness representation framework. We also need to delve into the levels of consciousness with 
the help of a cognitive paradigm. I have discussed the perceptual level of consciousness, focusing on 
narrated perception, but we also need to look into other categories of perception representation as well 
as the ways in which other levels of consciousness, for example sensation and emotion, are 
represented.  
Pallarés-García, for example, has pointed out the close relationship between thought, perception 
and emotion. This has been noted in psychology and science. For example, Damasio argues that 
“consciousness begins as the feeling of what happens when we see or hear or touch … it is a feeling 
that accompanies the making of any kind of image – visual, auditory, tactile, visceral – within our 
living organisms” (1999: 26).  Note that Chafe defines consciousness as what we experience, which is 
made up of perception, action, evaluation (emotion is included in it) and introspection (1994: 31, see 
also 4.2). These studies imply that representation of emotion can be explored as one of the levels of 
consciousness. Note also that Chafe includes action as a part of consciousness. Palmer (2004) similarly 
suggests that action is also important for the construction of fictional consciousness. Action has been 
central to the philosophical discipline. An action is not a mere doing. In order for an action to be an 
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action, “mental notions such as awareness, knowledge, belief, desires, intention, and purposes are 
necessary” in addition to “bodily movement” (Palmer, 2004: 119). Ludwig Wittgenstein thinks it is 
difficult to disentangle mental behaviour from physical behaviour: if there is a statement “I noticed 
that he was out of humour”, “is this a report about his behavior or his state of mind?” (1958: 179, 
quoted in Palmer, 2004: 120). On the basis of the philosophy of action, Palmer proposes “the 
thought-action continuum”, demonstrating that it is difficult to draw a clear line between thought and 
action (2004: 212-214). One example that falls on the fuzzy borderline area of the thought-action 
continuum is a reporting clause with a modifying adverb (e.g. “said I desperately”). The 
thought-action continuum could also be located somewhere on “an alternative sliding scale”. In the 
same vein, there most likely exist perception-action, perception-emotion, thought-emotion, and 
emotion-action continua in addition to thought-perception and thought-action continua. If there were, 
these continua on the levels of consciousness might help to complete the alternative scale for 
consciousness representation, but more work seems to be required to apply them to the scale for levels 
of consciousness.  
Another important point is that we should always bear in mind that fictional texts have two 
represented subjects: the narrator and the character (third-person narratives), or the narrating self and 
the experiencing self (first-person narratives). Chafe supposes that “the narrator’s consciousness as he 
produces the language is irrelevant” in the displaced mode except for a few cases of “brief excursions 
in the ordinary immediate mode” (1994: 234). However, especially in the authorial first-person 
narrative situation, the consciousness of the narrating self as well as that of the experiencing self is 
very frequently represented as in (6), and curiously, they are sometimes mingled as in (7): 
(6) Nothing cou’d please me better than that; and when Amy repeated it, I was so fond of it, that 
I ask’d my QUAKER, (I won’t call her Landlady, ’tis indeed, too course a Word for her, and 
she deserv’d a much better) I say, I ask’d her if she wou’d sell it; (Roxna: 211-212) 
(7) … so these three poor desolate Men knew nothing how certain of Deliverance and Supply 
they were, how near it was to them, and how effectually and really they were in a Condition 
of Safety, at the same Time that they thought themselves lost, and their Case desperate. 
  So little do we see before us in the World, and so much reason have we to depend 
cheerfully upon the great Maker of the World, that he does not leave his Creatures so 
absolutely destitute, but that in the worst Circumstances they have always something to be 
thankful for, and sometimes are nearer their Deliverance than they imagine; nay, are even 
brought to their Deliverance by the Means by which they seem to be brought to their 
Destruction.  
  It was just at the Top of High-Water when these People came on Shore, … (Robinson 
Crusoe: 212) 
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The consciousness of the narrating self is represented in the parenthetical sentence (“(I won’t call her 
Landlady, ’tis indeed, too course a Word for her, and she deserv’d a much better)”) and the following 
idiomatic phrase (“I say”) in (6). The second paragraph of (7) could be interpreted either as the 
experiencing self’s continuing consciousness, or as the consciousness of the narrating self inserted 
between that of the experiencing self.24 These examples show the importance of looking into the 
subtleties and complexity in the relationship between the consciousness of the two represented 
subjects. 
In sum, for the better understanding of fictional consciousness, we should expand the 
consciousness representation paradigm with more attentive investigation into 1) the ways in which 
fictional consciousness is represented in first-person narratives, 2) the ways in which fictional 
consciousness is represented in the narratives before Austen, 3) the levels of consciousness and their 
linguistic realization, and 4) the relationship between two represented subjects, the narrator (the 
narrating self) and the character (the experiencing self). 
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